Consumer Health Data Privacy Policy
Effective date: November 16, 2026 Last updated: November 16, 2026 Applies to: United States residents, including Washington State and Nevada, whose consumer health data laws this policy is written for. This is a separate policy on purpose: those laws require it to have its own link, distinct from the general Privacy Policy, and it does.
Who we are: Maison Mason LLC, a New York limited liability company doing business as AroundBack ("AroundBack", "we", "us"), 2248 Broadway #1231, New York, NY 10024, United States · privacy@aroundbackapp.com.
1. Why this document exists
AroundBack is a dating and social app for LGBTQ+ adults. Two things follow from that, and we would rather state them than let them sit unsaid:
- Some information in the app relates to sexual health: most directly, the sexual health information you can record on your phone and choose to share in a private chat (Section 2.1a), and the optional safer-sex tags you can attach to a private journal entry (Section 2.1).
- Several laws treat a broader category as "consumer health data" than most people expect, including inferences about health status and, in some readings, information about gender-affirming or sexual-health services.
So rather than argue about the boundary, this document describes everything in the product that touches health: where it lives, who can read it, and what we do and do not do with it. Nearly all of it never leaves your phone. That is a design decision, not an accident, and it is the reason this document is short.
2. The categories of health-related data in AroundBack
2.1 The Encounter Journal: safer-sex tags in a private log
The Encounter Journal is an optional, private log you can keep for your own records. If you use it, an entry may include safer-sex tags you choose from a fixed list:
Condom used · On PrEP · They're on PrEP · Tested recently · Talked status · Bareback
An entry may also carry a date, a nickname you type, a link to the other person's AroundBack account (added automatically when you log them from their profile or from your chat with them), a frozen thumbnail of the person's photo taken at the moment you logged it, tags describing the encounter, a rating, and a free-text note. One safer-sex tag, "They're on PrEP", records something about the other person rather than you.
Where it lives. On your iPhone. It is encrypted at rest with AES-GCM under a key that:
- exists only in that device's Keychain,
- is not readable while the device is locked, and
- is destroyed, together with the encrypted file, when you use the one-tap wipe.
We cannot read it. By default it is never transmitted to us at all.
Duress mode. If you unlock the app with your duress PIN, the journal reads and writes nothing: the decoy account shows an empty journal and never opens the real one, which stays on the phone as an encrypted file.
The optional backup. If, and only if, you choose Back up now in the journal's Backup & restore screen, your device encrypts the whole journal under a key derived on-device from a passphrase we never see, and uploads the resulting blob. To us it is opaque bytes. We store one blob per account, return it to you on request, and delete it when you ask. We cannot decrypt it, and neither can anyone who compels us to hand it over. Photo thumbnails of other people are stripped from the backup before upload, so a wipe on your device really destroys them and a restore cannot resurrect them.
2.1a Sexual health information you choose to share in a chat
Separately from the journal, you can record your own sexual health information in the app (You, App & data, Sexual health) and share it with one person at a time inside a private chat. All of it is optional, and the app asks for your agreement before you first record anything, before your first share, and before it shares anything automatically.
- What it can hold. Prevention methods from a fixed list (Condoms, On PrEP, Undetectable, On doxyPEP, Let's talk about it); your HIV status, which sits behind its own Add HIV status step; and when you were last tested, as a range such as "1 to 3 months ago", never a date. Choosing Undetectable also records your HIV status, and the app tells you so before it does.
- Where it lives. On your iPhone, encrypted under a key that exists only in that device's Keychain and is not readable while the device is locked. It is left out of device backups, so it does not move to a new phone. Opening it asks for Face ID, Touch ID or your phone's passcode. We do not hold it.
- When you share it. It goes to the person you choose as an end-to-end encrypted chat message. Our relay carries it like any other message and cannot read it. Their phone keeps an encrypted copy until you revoke it, a newer share from you replaces it, they remove it, or they sign out of or delete their account. You keep a note that you shared (with whom and when, never what), which you can clear at any time.
- Automatic sharing. If you turn it on, the app sends your information the first time you open a conversation that started after you turned it on. Each time you come back to the app it asks for Face ID, Touch ID or your passcode before the first automatic send, each send waits 30 seconds so you can stop it, you can exclude anyone, and it never applies to conversations you already had. Turning it off stops future sends; it does not take back earlier ones.
- Revoking. Revoking sends a message that removes the card from the other person's app. It cannot recall what they already saw, screenshotted or remember.
- Your consents to record, to share and to share automatically are kept on your phone, not on our servers.
- Receiving. If you would rather not see other members' disclosures, a setting makes your app drop any that arrive after you turn it on, without showing or keeping them. A card you already have stays until you remove it.
2.2 "Your Year on AroundBack": derived health statistics
The year-in-review feature computes summary figures from your journal, including a protection rate (the share of encounters tagged with a condom or PrEP) and a PrEP share (the share tagged "On PrEP").
These are derived entirely on your device, from data that is already on your device, and they are never transmitted to us. A card leaves your phone only if you choose Share this card, which makes an image of the card on screen for you to send wherever you choose; the app asks you to confirm first and warns that the image can include private details.
2.3 Free text you write
Profile prompts, profile tags, report descriptions and message bodies are all free text. If you type health information into one of them, it becomes health information in that place:
- Messages are end-to-end encrypted, and we cannot read them. Reporting a message sends us its identifier and our relay's confirmation that it was genuinely sent, never the message itself (Section 2.3a); anything you type into the report is a report description, below.
- Profile prompts and tags are stored on our servers in readable form and are visible to whoever you make them visible to. If you write your status into a prompt, we hold it.
- Report descriptions are readable by our moderators, because a moderator has to read a report to act on it.
- Profile details. Some profile details can reveal sexual activity or health even when they are not written as a sentence: your pronouns, tags, body type, position, height, prompts, relationship status and ethnicity. We store them only with your consent, asked in the app as two separate questions, and withdrawing either consent deletes them from our servers.
We do not scan these fields for health terms, do not extract health attributes from them, and do not build health inferences from them.
2.3a A report that another member may be at risk
Every report is filed under a reason chosen from a fixed list, and one of those reasons is not an accusation. A member who is worried that someone may be about to hurt themselves can report them under the reason the app shows as "Worried about them". That reason is a statement about the reported member's mental health, made by someone else, and it is written into our moderation record in readable form. It is the one report reason that is itself a statement about your health, so it gets its own section rather than a clause. It is not the only way health information about you can arrive from someone other than you, and the other two are described where they arise: whatever a reporter types into the description of a report filed under any reason (Section 2.3), and a sexual-health disclosure of yours that a reporter attaches as sealed evidence to a report of outing or health-status harassment (Section 2.5).
What it is:
- A fixed value, not a diagnosis. The reason is one value from a fixed list. It is not a status, a diagnosis or a clinical finding, and we derive no inference from it: the only things our systems set from it are a flag that marks the case as a welfare case, the place the case takes in the moderator queue, and the schedule for the one note described below. The record it sits on holds what every report holds: the reason, whatever the reporter typed in the description (Section 2.3), the account it was filed about, the account that filed it and when, and, if the report was made from a message, the identifier of that message together with our relay's confirmation that it was genuinely sent, never the message itself, which stays end-to-end encrypted. If the reporter's own account was suspended or banned at the time they filed, the record notes that so a moderator can weigh the report; that note is about the reporter, not about you.
- Readable by our moderators, by the member who filed it, and by no one else. The reporter sees their own report in their list of reports and in their data export. Every such report is placed on a moderation case that only a moderator can close: nothing automated resolves it, filters it out or removes it from the queue, and a welfare case cannot be closed in bulk with other cases; a moderator opens it on its own. The report itself, the reason, the description and the reporter's identity are given to no partner and no vendor for any purpose of its own.
- Held in the moderation record. It stays on the case for as long as the case is kept, under the criteria in Section 8 of the Privacy Policy. A welfare report is not repeat-offender history, and it is kept for one reason: so that how we handled a concern about someone's safety can be audited afterwards. When the reported member deletes their account, the record stops naming them: the account id on it is replaced with a constant marker, everywhere on the record including free text, so the reason survives as a moderation fact that no longer points at a person. Prose a reporter wrote that describes someone without naming their account cannot be rewritten by that step, and we say so rather than imply otherwise.
What we do not do with it. We want to be precise here, because the reporting system was built for accusations and this reason is not one:
- It places no restriction on the reported member. It is never the grounds for hiding them from discovery, it is never counted as one of the reports that place an automatic hide, and it is never the report that places one: a hide can rest only on other members' accusations. It adds nothing to the risk score or to the count of prior enforcement actions we keep about them. It does change two things on the moderation case itself, and we say so: the case is marked as a welfare case, and it is placed near the front of the moderator queue and on our 24 hour first-response clock, so that a person who may be at risk is seen quickly rather than slowly. A moderator reading the case is told, on the case itself, that the report accuses them of nothing, that it placed no hide and recorded no risk signal, and that a warning, suspension or ban would have to rest on other reports.
- It is never used to infer anything about the reported member, never combined with anything else we hold to form a view of their health, and never read by any automatic process to change anything about their account or what they see, other than to show them the note below once. The one thing that can change their account is a moderator's decision on the case it sits on; any sanction is shown to the member with a statement of reasons and can be appealed.
- Filing a report of this kind sends the reported member one thing, and nothing else. Between one and two days after the first such report about them, at a moment software picks, the app shows them a short note: that someone on AroundBack told us they were worried about them, that it changes nothing about their account, and the free crisis lines for where they are. No person decides to send it; software sends it on that clock, and the delay and the unpredictable moment are what keep it from pointing at a person or a time. It names no one. We send at most one such note in thirty days, however many members were worried, and one member's reports can trigger at most three notes in a week, so nobody can use this to keep sending someone a note. The only human hand in it is a moderator who reads the case inside that window and stops the note because the report is itself abuse; that is recorded on the case, and it holds: a stopped note is not rescheduled by a repeat report inside the thirty days. The note produces no other notification, email or message to them, beyond a content-free prompt to open the app on the phone that received it (the prompt does not say what the note is, to the phone or to the service that carries it), and we do not promise the reporter anything more: we are not a crisis service, and we would rather say so than imply one. The reporter is shown the crisis resources too, and a line saying that a note goes out unless one went out recently, and that it does not say who was worried. What we keep of it: the schedule (which case it came from, whose report set it, when it was due, and whether it was sent, stopped or withheld) with the moderation record, and the note itself with the day it was sent and whether you have seen it; that note is in your data export.
- One thing can leave AroundBack because of it, and it is a human decision, never an automatic one. If the moderator reading the case believes there is an imminent danger to someone's life or safety, they can make the emergency referral described in Section 6. That referral carries our internal account id for the member, our reference for the case, a statement that there is a threat to life or safety, the country or region the moderator names for routing if they name one, and a routing instruction; it does not carry the report itself, the reporter's identity, any message or your position.
- The reporter is told only that a person has read it. Their own list of reports shows nothing about the reported member; once a moderator has decided the case it shows that a person has read the report, whatever the decision was, and nothing else is sent to their device.
- We count how many reports of each kind we receive, as a number with no member attached, for our own operations and for aggregate transparency reporting. A count is not a record about you.
If you are the person such a report was filed about, you can ask us at privacy@aroundbackapp.com whether one exists, and we will answer without naming the person who filed it. Deleting your account severs the record from you as described above; Section 8 names the limits.
2.4 Location, and what it would mean here
Some laws treat precise location that could indicate an attempt to obtain health services as consumer health data. AroundBack's location handling is described in full in Section 3.3 of the Privacy Policy. The relevant facts here:
- In discovery, another member never receives your precise position or a distance in meters. The grid shows a coarse band. A Now you post can appear on the Now map as its own marker where few people are around; the marker sits at the center of the roughly 1 km grid cell it was posted from, offset slightly for each viewer, never at your own position. Switching Show on the map off, or posting from inside one of your privacy zones, keeps it off the map. The deliberate live shares described below are the exception, and they are the exception on purpose: there, the person you chose does see where you are.
- No coordinate we write down is a reading of where you were, but read the fourth bullet before you conclude the file cannot place you. A discovery fix is coarsened to a roughly 1 km grid cell center before the store is serialized, and the deliberate shares below are not written to the file at all. The file does hold precise coordinates for the published street addresses of the venues in our public directory; those are facts about businesses, not about you. We state the exception rather than claim there is none. What that exception can become, when a record of yours names one of those venues, is the fourth bullet; we would rather you meet that qualification here than discover it later.
- A precise coordinate held in memory for discovery (your own fix, or a Travel Mode pin) is coarsened after 6 hours.
- We do not classify, tag, or infer anything about the kind of place you are in: we make no venue-level or place-type inference, and we hold no notion of what kind of place you are near. What we keep is coarse: the roughly 1 km cell of your most recent location fix, when you entered that cell, and the cells where you recently stayed long enough to be given finer distance bands (Section 3.3 of the Privacy Policy). We draw no boundary around a health care facility, a venue or any other specific place to act on your location. The one place-based boundary a member can set in the app is a privacy zone you draw yourself: your phone checks whether you are inside one only to blur your location before it is sent and to keep a Now you post there off the map, and your zones never leave your phone.
- But we will not stop the paragraph there, because the honest version has one more sentence. Some venues in that catalogue are health-adjacent (the directory includes an LGBTQ+ health clinic) and several things you can do in the app link you to a venue. Most of them are statements of intent, not observations of where you went: we never learn whether you attended, and no code infers a visit from one. One of them is not. A Now drop you anchor to a venue is you saying you are at that address at that moment; the discreet version of a Now drop hides who you are from other members when the drop is read, but the record we write down still carries your account id next to the venue. We say so because a clinic is in that directory. Each record we know of is bounded: we publish how long we keep it, and delete it on that clock; a background sweep does the deleting, so the record leaves the database file rather than merely leaving your screen. Deleting your account removes the records in the table below at once. A future record that links you to a venue inherits the same obligation. The table below is generated from our code rather than written out here, and a test fails our build if the two disagree. Section 3.3a of the Privacy Policy describes the separate check we run against our stored database to catch a record of this kind we have not written down, and is candid about what that check does not reach:
| What links you to a venue | What it says | What kind of statement it is | How long we keep it |
|---|---|---|---|
| An event RSVP | the event, and so the venue it is held at | An intention (we never learn whether you went) | Deleted 7 days after the event ends |
| A saved event | the event you bookmarked, and so the venue it is held at | An intention (we never learn whether you went) | Deleted 7 days after the event ends |
| A Now drop anchored to a venue | that you said you were AT that address, at that moment, next to whatever note and intent you posted — and it says so even for a discreet drop, where the mask other members see is applied when the drop is read, not when it is written | You saying you are there (not an inference — you posted it) | Deleted when the drop expires — at most 12 hours after you post it — by a background sweep, so it goes whether or not anyone opens the map |
| A listing report you filed | the venue or event you reported, and so its address, and any words you added to the report; nothing about whether you were there. The report itself is kept for the listing's sake; what is deleted is the link to you and the words you wrote | A report you filed (it says nothing about whether you went) | Your id is removed from it, and the words you wrote are deleted, 30 days after the report is resolved, and at the latest 90 days after you filed it whether or not it was resolved |
Deleted means deleted: a background sweep removes the record from the store, so it leaves the database file too, rather than being hidden from a screen. Deleting your account removes the records in this table at once. The one exception is a listing report you filed: the report is kept for the listing's sake, and it is your id that is removed from it, at once on deletion and on the clock above otherwise.
This table is generated from one table in our source code rather than retyped here, so the rows above and the clocks our deletion sweeps actually run on are the same text. What that does not by itself prove is that the table names every such record — the separate check for that is a scan of the stored database file, and its limits are described in §3.3a of the privacy policy.
The exceptions are shares you initiate deliberately. Those that exist today are a Guardian meetup check-in (exact live location, to a trusted contact you choose, until you mark yourself safe) and On My Way (your live position shared with the person you are meeting, from your chat with them, capped at 2 hours and auto-ending once you have arrived). On My Way is the one place another member is given real distance and direction, and an exact position once you are within about 200 meters; that is what it is for. Both are exact for as long as they run, both live in memory only, and both are deleted rather than coarsened when they end: an On My Way position when the trip ends; a Guardian fix the moment you mark yourself safe, cancel, or switch sharing off. That rule, rather than the length of the list, is the commitment, and any live-location feature we add inherits it. Starting a check-in with location sharing switched off stores no coordinate at all.
A check-in ended with your duress code is deliberately different in one respect: it keeps your location flowing to your contact, because you may need to be found. It is not different in how long it persists; a duress check-in is deleted on the same clock as a genuine safe return, so it cannot be told apart from one by waiting.
2.5 What we deliberately do not collect
- We do not ask for, and have no field for, HIV status, test results, test dates, vaccination status, medications, diagnoses, or any clinical information as a public profile attribute. The safer-sex tags in Section 2.1 exist only inside the private on-device journal. Separately, you may optionally include a sexual-health disclosure inside a private message: that content is end-to-end encrypted and we cannot read it in normal operation, but if a message is reported for safety review it is collected into a sealed, short-lived moderation record we can decrypt to act on the report — which is why we declare health data as collected on our App Store privacy label.
- We do not infer health status from your behavior, your messages, your searches, your location, or what another member reports about you (Section 2.3a).
- We do not receive health data from any company, broker, partner or feed, and we do not buy data about you from anyone. Health-related information about you can reach us from another member in three ways, each described where it arises: the "Worried about them" report reason (Section 2.3a), the free text of a report description (Section 2.3), and a sealed disclosure of yours attached as evidence to a report (Section 2.5).
- We use no analytics SDK, no advertising SDK, and no advertising system, so there is no pipeline through which health-adjacent data could be exported to a vendor. Our server carries zero third-party runtime dependencies.
3. Where consumer health data comes from
Only from members using the app, and only when they enter it. Nearly all of it comes from you, about you. The exceptions are the last row, and one journal tag, "They're on PrEP", which is something you record about the other person:
| Source | What |
|---|---|
| You, in the Encounter Journal | Safer-sex tags, entry details, notes |
| Your device, from your journal | The derived year-in-review statistics |
| You, in free-text fields | Anything health-related you choose to type |
| You, in your profile | The profile details in Section 2.3 that you choose to fill in, with your consent |
| You, in a chat | The sexual health information you record on your phone and choose to share (Section 2.1a). It reaches us only as ciphertext we cannot read |
| Another member, in a report about you | The "Worried about them" report reason (Section 2.3a); whatever they type in the report description (Section 2.3); a sealed disclosure of yours attached as evidence (Section 2.5) |
We collect it from no other source. There is no third-party data broker, no partner feed, no device-fingerprinting vendor, and no advertising identifier in this product.
4. How it is used
- Journal entries and their tags are used only on your own device: to show you your journal, to compute your year-in-review, and, when an entry you save from a chat or a profile records a bad or unsafe experience, to offer you blocking or reporting that person.
- Sexual health information you record is used only to show it to you on your phone and to send it to the people you choose, including automatically if you turned that on (Section 2.1a).
- The encrypted backup blob, if you make one, is used only to give the blob back to you when you restore. We cannot use it for anything else because we cannot read it.
- Free text is used for the purpose of the field it is in: showing your profile to people you have chosen to show it to, or letting a moderator act on a report.
- A "Worried about them" report reason is used to tell the moderator who reads the case what the reporter's concern was, to send the reported member the one support note described in Section 2.3a, and for the handling every report reason gets, none of which is about the reported member as a person: it decides how soon a moderator looks at the case; it is written, as the reason the case was opened, into the append-only moderation audit log; it chooses which crisis resources the reporter is shown after filing and decides that the reporter is later told only that a person has read it; it appears in the reporter's own list of reports and data export; and it is counted, as a number with no member attached, for our own operations and for aggregate transparency reporting. It places no restriction on the reported member, adds nothing to any risk score, and is not used to infer anything about them (Section 2.3a).
We do not use any of it for advertising, for profiling, for research, for model training, or for any secondary purpose. We collect and use consumer health data only to provide the services you request, with your consent where the law requires it, and we do not collect or share more than that. The one category we hold that you did not enter yourself is the report reason in Section 2.3a: we hold it because reading and answering a member who says someone may be in danger is part of running a safe service for everyone who uses it, and we use it for nothing else.
5. We do not sell consumer health data
We do not sell consumer health data. We never have, and we will not.
Specifically:
- We do not sell, rent, license, trade, or otherwise exchange consumer health data for money or for any other valuable consideration.
- We do not share consumer health data for targeted or cross-context behavioral advertising.
- We do not collect a signed authorization to sell consumer health data, because we have no sale to authorize.
- Because we do not sell consumer health data, we do not obtain or maintain authorizations for such sales.
For the journal tags in Section 2.1 and the sexual health information in Section 2.1a this is also true by construction rather than only by promise: they are held in a form we cannot read, on your device or as ciphertext we have no key for, so there is nothing to sell even if we wanted to. For what we can read (Sections 2.3 and 2.3a), the commitment above is the whole of it.
6. Who we share it with
No one.
- Journal entries are on your device. They are not transmitted to us.
- If you back up the journal, we hold ciphertext. We cannot read it and we do not disclose it to anyone.
- The derived year-in-review statistics are never sent to us. A card leaves your device only as an image you choose to share yourself.
- A sexual health disclosure goes only to the members you share it with, as an end-to-end encrypted message. We relay ciphertext we cannot read and keep no copy we could open.
- Free text goes only where you send it: to the people you make your profile visible to, or, for a report, to our own moderators.
- A "Worried about them" report reason goes only to our own moderators, and the reporter keeps their own copy. The reporter learns that a person has read it and nothing else. The support note it triggers goes to the reported member's own app; the prompt to open the app travels through Apple's push service like every notification we send, and carries no content and no word for what the note is. The one thing that can leave AroundBack because of it is the emergency referral below, made by a person, never by software.
We employ no service provider, processor, contractor or affiliate that receives consumer health data for any purpose of its own, because there is no readable consumer health data leaving our systems for them to use. The readable records named in this policy (profile details, report descriptions and the "Worried about them" reason) are stored where everything our server holds is stored: on a machine and disk we rent from our hosting provider, Railway, as Section 6 of the Privacy Policy describes, and they pass through Cloudflare, which carries our traffic to that machine. Neither is given any data for a purpose of its own: that is a hosting relationship, not a data-sharing one. The database file on that disk is not encrypted at rest by our software, so access to it is governed by Railway's terms and security practices and by ours. Copies of that database that leave the disk are encrypted by our software before they leave and are kept at Cloudflare R2, which holds bytes it cannot open. If any provider is ever given consumer health data for a purpose of its own, this policy will be updated first and will name it.
The one path we cannot rule out is compelled legal process. If we receive valid legal process for a journal backup, what we are able to produce is an encrypted blob we cannot decrypt. We say this not as a boast but because it is the honest answer to "what happens if you are subpoenaed": we hand over what we have, and what we have is unreadable. The moderation record is different: it is readable, and a valid demand for it could be answered with it, including a "Worried about them" reason on a case about you.
The emergency referral. As the Privacy Policy and the Terms both say, we may notify emergency services or a competent authority to protect someone's life or safety. Here that means: a moderator, never an automatic process, who reads a case and believes there is an imminent danger to a person's life or safety can raise an emergency referral through our escalation contact, which routes it to a competent authority or, where a police referral would itself endanger the member, to a safe non-governmental channel. The referral carries our internal account id and case reference, a statement that there is a threat to life or safety, the country or region the moderator names, and that routing instruction. In a welfare case, that statement concerns a danger to the member's own health. It does not carry a report, a reporter's identity, a message, your position or a sexual health value.
7. How long it is kept
| Data | Retention |
|---|---|
| Journal entries on your device | Until you delete the entry, wipe the journal, or delete the app. One tap destroys both the encrypted file and its key |
| Encrypted journal backup on our servers | Until you remove it (Remove backup from server) or delete your account. Each backup you make replaces the last; we keep one blob per account |
| Sexual health information you recorded (Section 2.1a) | On your phone until you delete it, use Erase everything now, or sign out or delete your account. Deleting it also revokes every share. It is in no backup |
| A sexual health card someone shared with you | On your phone until they revoke it, a newer share from them replaces it, you remove it, either of you blocks the other, either of you deletes your account, or you sign out. It is also removed the next time your app successfully asks us for your conversation list, if that list no longer shows a one-to-one chat between you and the sender. We stop listing a chat when either account is deleted, when either of you blocks the other, when it has had no live message and no new message for at least 90 days, and if we lose our data. A phone that stays off keeps the card until that check succeeds. It is in no backup. Once you switch off receiving disclosures, a card that arrives is not kept |
| Your record that you shared | On your phone until you clear it, use Erase everything now, or sign out or delete your account |
| Your sexual health consents | On your phone until you withdraw them, use Erase everything now, or sign out or delete your account. They are never sent to us |
| Year-in-review statistics | Not stored anywhere. Recomputed on your device each time you open it |
| Health information you typed into a profile field | Until you edit or remove it, withdraw a consent that covers it (which deletes it from our servers), or delete your account |
| Health information you typed into a report | Retained with the moderation record under the criteria in Section 8 of the Privacy Policy; severed from your identity when your account is deleted |
| A "Worried about them" report reason on a case about you | Retained with the moderation record under the criteria in Section 8 of the Privacy Policy, so that our handling of it can be audited; not repeat-offender history. When you delete your account the record stops naming you: the account id on it is replaced with a constant marker, free text included |
| The support note we sent you after such a report, the day it was sent and whether you saw it | Kept until you delete your account, when it is deleted outright; it is in your data export. The schedule behind it stays with the moderation record |
| Health information inside a message | End-to-end encrypted; ciphertext held for at most 30 days by default, or less if you set a disappearing timer, or 5 seconds after delivery is acknowledged |
| A record that links you to a venue in the directory | Kept on a published clock and then removed by a background sweep, so it leaves the stored file too. The records and their windows are in the generated table in Section 2.4 rather than repeated here, so there is only one copy to keep true |
8. Your rights
You can, at any time and at no cost, on any tier:
- See it. The journal is on your device and readable in the app. Your server-side export (You → Account & security → Passkeys, sessions, recovery & data → Your data) includes the encrypted backup blob if you have one, plus the data we hold that you supplied or that was generated for your account. It does not include reports other members filed about you, for the reason named below; you can ask us about those. Your sexual health information, and the list of people who can see it, are on your phone in You, App & data, Sexual health.
- Delete it. Wipe the journal in one tap, delete the backup, or delete your entire account. Deleting your account removes the backup blob along with everything else. None of these actions is paywalled or requires contacting us. For sexual health information: delete what you recorded (which also revokes every share), revoke a single share, clear your record that you shared, or use Erase everything now, which does all three and removes your consents.
- Withdraw consent. The journal is uploaded only when you choose Back up now, so nothing further is uploaded unless you choose it again, and Remove backup from server deletes what was uploaded. Withdrawing a sexual health consent means the app asks you again before it next records or shares anything, and withdrawing the consent to share automatically turns automatic sharing off; neither deletes anything or takes back what you already shared. Withdrawing the consumer health data consent for your profile deletes the profile details it covers from our servers.
Deletion has real limits, and we would rather name them than let you discover them:
- A message you already sent is on the recipient's device. We cannot reach it.
- Records we are legally required to preserve (see Section 3.5 of the Privacy Policy) are not removable by request.
- Data already deleted cannot be restored; the journal wipe destroys the key, and that is the point.
- A report another member filed about you, including a "Worried about them" reason, is part of our moderation record rather than your data export, because it is the reporter's statement and an export that carried it would reveal who reports whom. You can ask us whether one exists (Section 2.3a). Deleting your account severs that record from you; it is not otherwise removable by request, for the reasons in Section 8 of the Privacy Policy.
Requests, response times, appeals and non-retaliation. To exercise any of these rights outside the app, email privacy@aroundbackapp.com. We confirm that a request comes from the account holder before acting on it, respond within 45 days, and never retaliate against you for asking: exercising these rights costs you nothing and changes nothing about your service. If we refuse a request, we will explain why and how to appeal; appeals go to a different reviewer and are decided within 45 days, in writing. Washington residents who remain unsatisfied may contact the Washington State Attorney General at atg.wa.gov/file-complaint; Nevada residents may contact the Nevada Attorney General; residents of other states may contact their state Attorney General.
9. Security
The journal is protected by device-bound encryption whose key is unavailable while your phone is locked, by the app lock if you turn it on (Face ID or Touch ID, or an unlock PIN you set for the app, never your phone's passcode), and by duress mode, which shows an empty decoy journal and never opens the real one. Your sexual health information (Section 2.1a) asks for Face ID, Touch ID or your phone's passcode each time you open it. The backup is encrypted before it leaves your device under a key derived from a passphrase we never receive.
The general security posture (passkeys and Sign in with Apple instead of passwords, end-to-end encryption, transparency-logged identity keys) is described in Section 10 of the Privacy Policy.
10. Changes
We will post changes here and, for material changes affecting consumer health data, notify you in the app before they take effect.
11. Contact
Maison Mason LLC d/b/a AroundBack 2248 Broadway #1231, New York, NY 10024, United States Privacy requests: privacy@aroundbackapp.com · Support: support@aroundbackapp.com