Transparency
This page states what we are capable of producing about a member — to a court, to an acquirer, to anyone — so nobody has to guess. The limits in the first section are enforced by architecture rather than by promise: they hold because we never hold the data, not because we agree not to look. The precise version of every claim here, including its caveats, is in our Privacy Policy.
What we cannot produce, no matter who asks
- The content of messages and calls. Direct and group messages are end-to-end encrypted; our server stores ciphertext and holds no message keys. Calls are relayed as encrypted media we never parse, and no call-recording capability exists in the product.
- Chat attachments, private album photos, and private videos. They are encrypted on your device before upload; we store opaque bytes.
- Your Encounter Journal. It lives on your phone. If you choose to back it up, what we hold is a blob encrypted under a passphrase we never receive. If we are compelled to hand it over, what we hand over is unreadable — that is the honest answer to "what happens if you are subpoenaed."
- A location history that could place you. Nothing we write to disk can locate a member: every member coordinate that reaches storage is a roughly 1 km grid-cell center, and deliberate live shares (Guardian and On My Way) are held in memory only and deleted when the share ends. The narrow exception — records that link you to a published venue address, each on a bounded deletion clock — is spelled out in Section 3.3a of the Privacy Policy.
- A password. Sign-in is Sign in with Apple and passkeys; there is no password of yours for us to hold, leak, or produce.
- A silent key substitution. Identity keys are published to an append-only transparency log, so swapping the key we advertise for a contact is detectable, and the app lets you compare safety numbers. It cannot by itself catch us showing different logs to different people, because no independent auditor watches it yet. (The caveats to this are in Privacy Policy Section 4, and we'd rather you read them than assume there are none.)
- An advertising profile of you. No third-party ad network, analytics SDK, or data-broker relationship exists in the app or on our servers, and we build no advertising profile — so there is no such dataset to produce, sell, or leak.
What we can produce, stated honestly
An end-to-end-encrypted service still has an honest residual, and we would rather list it than let "we can't read your messages" imply more than it says. Within the retention windows published in Section 8 of the Privacy Policy, we hold and could be compelled to produce:
- Account and profile data: what you entered, and, if you sign in with Apple, the identifier and email address Apple gives us. Public photos and voice intros are the one place we hold plaintext media. The text you write for other members to see (your display name, headline, pronouns, tags, prompt answers, your boundaries, desires and intentions, and the note on a Now) is held in a form we can read, and so is the free text in a report or in a request for help getting back into your account.
- Messaging metadata: that an account has a conversation with another account, message sizes, and timing — not content. Dead conversations are forgotten entirely on the published clock.
- Coarsened location: grid-cell centers, and the bounded venue-link records described in Privacy Policy Section 3.3a.
- Sign-in security history (masked IP prefixes, never raw addresses), session records, purchase and entitlement records, and moderation records including reports filed by or about an account.
- The email address of anyone who asked to be told about AroundBack, described in Section 3.10 of the Privacy Policy. It is stored encrypted, but our running server holds the key in order to email them — so compulsion reaches it, and saying “it’s encrypted” without saying that would be the kind of half-answer this page exists to avoid. Each address is deleted when the person leaves the list, and within 12 months of signup in any case.
How we handle legal process
- We require valid legal process — a subpoena, court order, or search warrant appropriate to what is sought — and we resist overbroad or unlawful demands where we can.
- We may disclose data to protect someone's life or safety in an emergency, and where the law could criminalize the person involved — including places where LGBTQ+ people are criminalized — we route to appropriate crisis resources instead of authorities where we lawfully can.
- Confirmed child sexual abuse material is reported to NCMEC's CyberTipline as federal law requires, with associated content and metadata, including the address the upload came from, preserved in isolation. This is a legal duty; it is not discretionary and survives account deletion.
- Where we are permitted to notify a member about legal process concerning their account, our intent is to do so.
Transparency report
AroundBack has not yet launched, and we have received no legal demands of any kind. Beginning with our first full quarter of operation, we will publish here the number of legal demands received, the kind of process involved, and how many we complied with in whole or in part — in the most precise bands the law allows us to report.